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The recent trend among many philosophers of religion has been to 
interpret divine eternity as an everlasting temporality in which an 
omnitemporal God exists in and throughout the whole of time. The 
fundamental distinction between the classical account of eternity as 
timelessness and the more recent, personalist account of eternity as unlimited 
temporality rests upon the question of God’s immutability. Proponents of the 
classical view say God is timeless because he is immutable. If God were in 
time, he would be subject to change and thus would not be the first cause of 
motion or the creator of the world. Those adhering to divine temporalism 
assert that God cannot be atemporal because acts of creation and causation 
necessarily entail that the agent undergo some change and thus must be in 
time. 
An influential classical account of divine eternity comes from St. Thomas 
Aquinas, who builds upon Boethius’s famous definition of eternity: “the 
whole, perfect, and simultaneous possession of endless life.”1 In this paper, I 
will examine Aquinas’s account of God as timelessly eternal. First, I will 
look at how Aquinas derives the various parts of the Boethian definition of 
eternity from the concepts time and mutability. Second, I will consider a 
famous objection that posits Aquinas’s account of a timeless God is 
incompatible with omniscience because God would not have knowledge of 
what is past, present and future at any time. I will explain how answering this 
objection correctly is necessary to avoid serious problems to theism. I will 
then propose a solution to this problem and attempt to show that Aquinas’s 
notion of divine atemporality is not incoherent. 
Before beginning, several disclaimers are necessary. Since this paper 
focuses on Aquinas’s account, I will take as granted that his arguments for 
divine immutability are sound. In addition, I will also take the Aristotelian 
                                                          
1 Appears in News from the Raven: Essays from Sam Houston State University on 
Medieval and Renaissance Thought, Ed. Darci N. Hill (Newcastle Upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 262-285. 
Eternal God: Divine Atemporality in Thomas Aquinas 263 
definition of time to be correct. I will not provide any direct critique of 
temporalist accounts, since by and large such arguments are reducible either 
to debates over immutability or treatments of time far too technical for my 
purposes. 
In this first section, I will examine Aquinas’s account of eternity. I will 
first show how Aquinas derives the definition of eternity from time and its 
connection with change. Second, I will explain what it means to call eternity 
a measure. Last, I will briefly show that God is eternal and is his own 
eternity. 
Boethius defines eternity as “the whole, perfect, and simultaneous 
possession of endless life.”2 Aquinas explains that this definition is derived 
from the definition of time. Time, as Aristotle says, is the number or measure 
of motion according to the before and after.3 Since mutable creatures, insofar 
as they undergo motion or change, have a certain measure of their motion, 
i.e. time, an immutable being, insofar as it does not undergo motion or 
change, will possess its own measure of its changeless existence. Just as 
Aquinas comes to the notion of immutability from mutability, he likewise 
derives his notion of eternity from time: 
 
Just as it is fitting that we come to knowledge of the simple from the 
composite, so it is fitting that we come to knowledge of eternity from time, 
which is nothing other than the number of motion according to before and 
after.4 
 
Aquinas considers two aspects of mutability and immutability in order to 
derive his account of eternity. First, and most importantly, he considers time 
as the measure of motion according to its succession, from which we see that 
eternity is simultaneously whole and perfect. This will be the essential aspect 
of eternity. Second, he considers time as the measure of motion insofar as 
motion is an activity which begins and ends, from which we see that eternity 
is interminable life.  
Concerning the first aspect, eternity as simultaneously whole and perfect, 
Aquinas begins by noting that time is the measure of motion insofar as it 
consists of successive parts: 
 
For since there is succession in any motion, and one part is after another, 
from this, that we number the before and after in motion, we apprehend time, 
which is nothing other than the number of before and after in motion.5 
 
Time, as a property of motion, follows necessarily from the successive nature 
of motion. This succession, i.e. the order of the parts of motion as prior and 
posterior, allows us to measure motion by numbering its distinct, successive 
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stages. Before continuing, let us clarify what it means to call time the 
measure of motion.6 
After giving his definition of time as the measure of motion in Physics 
IV.11, Aristotle provides an important qualification. We may speak of a 
number or measure in two ways: the number of what is numbered and the 
number by which we number. The former corresponds to numbers like five 
horses or twelve feet of fabric. The quantity “twelve feet” in “twelve feet of 
fabric” refers to the particular quantity of the fabric. It is an individual, as 
opposed to universal, accident which does not exist apart from the fabric. 
Aristotle calls it a numbered number because it is the numerable aspect of the 
fabric. Even if no one were to measure the fabric, it would still have this 
particular measurable quantity. We might say that a numbered number is 
properly distinguished as the number of some particular thing. On the other 
hand, the number by which we number is not the number of any particular 
thing. It is a purely logical being which exists apart from the particular 
quantity we are counting or measuring. The counting numbers one, two, 
three, etc. are not multitudes of any particular kind of units; they can be used 
to number any sort of numerable thing.  
As the measure of motion, time is a numbered number.  It does not exist 
apart from motion—it is not some separate independent entity like Newton’s 
reified Absolute Time or some accounts of space-time. Time is the 
quantifiable duration of motion. Thus, since eternity is analogously related to 
time as the immutable activity of an uncreated being is to the mutable activity 
of created being, eternity will be in an analogous sense the quantifiable 
duration of an immutable being. 
Since time is the measure of motion according to the prior and posterior, 
we must turn to how priority and posteriority belong to or, rather, do not 
belong to an immutable being. From understanding the relation between 
temporal priority and posteriority and eternal uniformity, we can begin to 
understand eternity as the measure of immutable activity. Aquinas explains 
that we come to eternity by negating the succession of motion. 
 
Now in that which lacks motion, and is always the same, there is no before 
and after. Just as the account of time consists in the numbering of prior and 
posterior in motion, so the account of eternity consists in the apprehension of 
the uniformity of that which is wholly outside motion.7 
 
Time consists in apprehending the different successive parts in the totality of 
motion and numbering them. Motion is an imperfect being because its parts 
exist successively rather than simultaneously. Viewed as a whole composed 
of parts, motion consists of a plurality of states of a single kind of actuality.8 
For an immutable being wholly without motion, there is no succession in its 
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states of existence. Its existence, taken as a whole, is not composed from a 
plurality of states of some one species of actuality; since there are no 
differences in its act, there is no distinction of parts, for there are no parts. Put 
another way, it is like a whole composed of parts which all coincide 
simultaneously with one another and thus cannot be distinguished. Compared 
with temporal duration, which is composed of successive parts, eternal 
duration has no distinction of parts because there is no succession of parts in 
an immutable existence. Eternity is a whole simultaneously, not successively. 
Thus Aquinas, following Boethius, states that eternity is simultaneously 
whole. 
One might object that this does not sufficiently distinguish an immutable 
being from mobile beings which are at rest. For what is at rest does not have 
different successive states present in it. Nevertheless, we can measure how 
long some object A is at rest. For example, Socrates sits from 10:00 am to 
11:00 am. Even though there is no change in the truth of the proposition 
“Socrates is sitting” from 10 am to 11 am, “Socrates sitting at 10:00” is 
different from “Socrates sitting at 11:00." By considering these different 
states insofar as one comes before and the other after, we may measure the 
duration of Socrates’s sitting. This is accomplished by relating the succession 
of different states of a motion occurring simultaneously with A’s resting, 
such as the motion of a clock B. We mark off the different states in the 
motion of B and, insofar as A and B are simultaneous, we distinguish 
corresponding states in A.  
This succession of temporal states in A (resting at time t, resting at t1) 
constitute what Peter Geach calls a “merely Cambridge change.” These states 
are identified in A according to the changing relations of B to A. This change 
of relation consists in some real change in B considered independently of A 
and no real change in A considered independently of B. There is no 
succession of really distinct states in A considered on its own. It simply rests. 
But, in relation to B, the duration of this rest can be measured. Since we can 
measure the temporal duration of a resting body which has no succession of 
really distinct states in it, might we not do the same for an immutable being 
by merely Cambridge relations to the various parts of a motion? If so, it 
seems that we may likewise measure the duration of an immutable being. By 
doing so, even though, just like a resting being, it does not have a succession 
of really distinct states per se, an immutable being will nonetheless have a 
measurable temporal succession consisting of merely Cambridge changes. 
However, this will not do. An immutable being has no actual or potential 
multiplicity of states which can be distinguished in any way. As Geach points 
out, it makes no sense to speak of distinguishing different states in a wholly 
immutable being: 
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Would a changeless being whose duration co-existed with that of changeable 
beings be anything more than a temporal being whose successive states were 
alike rather than variegated?—I deny the right to speak of ‘successive states’ 
in regard to such a being. For how would the states be differentiated? 
Perhaps it will be said: By relational properties; if a changing being has 
various states, then one state of the unchanging being will co-exist with one 
state of the changeable being and another with another state, and this will be 
enough to differentiate the states of the unchanging being. But once again, I 
deny that there are any ‘states’ of the unchanging being to be differentiated.9 
 
While it is true that we can measure the rest of a mutable being, it is only 
measurable per accidens. Insofar as it is potentially movable, we can 
meaningfully distinguish different states which could be the beginning of a 
motion or change. While not actually distinct, these states are potentially 
distinct. A Cambridge change may refer to actually (per se) or potentially 
(per accidens) distinct states in some subject. Since the merely Cambridge 
changes of A’s relation to the simultaneous motion B are temporal relations, 
they constitute a measurable temporal succession in A, albeit a per accidens 
succession. However, Cambridge changes do not apply to God in this 
manner. In a wholly changeless being, there are no different states at all, 
either actually or potentially, because such a being has no potency. Thus, it 
has no parts which could be distinguished by these propositions. 
If God is eternal, there is no time at which the proposition “God exists” is 
false, thus it seems that God’s existence runs parallel to time. This mistake 
can be traced to thinking of God’s simultaneously whole duration as having 
quasi-spatial extension. As Geach explains, 
  
My imaginary opponent is held captive by a picture: some such picture as a 
uniform blue line with a graduated ruler laid against it, so that we can 
discriminate the successive bits in the blue line. But time-order (as I have 
argued elsewhere) is categorically different from spatial order; and any such 
picture is limited in usefulness and profoundly dangerous. Nothing is sillier 
than to think you can settle philosophical problems about time by drawing 
diagrams.10 
 
Those who think there is a parallel between a resting mutable being and a 
perfect immutable being fail to distinguish the potentially changeable 
uniformity of rest from the changeless simplicity of the immutable. They 
conflate the uniformity of the two. A uniformly blue line which cannot be 
distinguished into different colors can still be distinguished into various 
spatial parts because its color is different from its extension. The latter’s 
composition from extended parts is in no way dependent upon the former’s 
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qualitative uniformity. Whether or not the line varies in color from segment 
to segment, it will still maintain its spatial composition. The eternity of an 
immutable being, on the other hand, does not have distinguishable parts. To 
continue the spatial metaphor, it is more like a point than a line. 
This image of a partless point may lead us to think we should not call 
eternity a whole at all. For “what has parts is called a whole. But this does not 
belong to eternity, since it is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be a 
whole.”11 Above I spoke of a whole whose parts are identical and unable to 
be distinguished to express that there is no succession in eternity. The lack of 
distinct states follows from removing the imperfect states of successive 
existence. Aquinas tells us that we properly call eternity a whole “not 
because it has parts, but insofar as it lacks nothing.”12 It lacks nothing 
because succession implies imperfection. If motion were not a succession of 
imperfect actualities, then, at each and every moment of a motion, the mobile 
would possess the full actuality of the motion’s terminus ad quem. In fact, 
this would correspond to rest. However, as I just noted, even what is at rest 
has a succession of different states in potency. But eternity does not have 
different states in act or potency, for it lacks nothing. Thus, because eternity 
lacks any imperfection, Aquinas adds ‘perfect’ to ‘simultaneous whole’ in the 
definition of eternity. 
From motion’s succession, Aquinas considers the second aspect of time 
and mutation: possessing a beginning and an end. The negation of this yields 
the other aspect found in Boethius’s definition eternity: interminable life. 
Aquinas, again following Aristotle, tells us that time measures motion insofar 
the total duration of motion is limited, i.e. insofar as motion has a beginning 
and an end.13 
Motion is a limited whole because it is the actuality of what exists in 
potency as potential. Motion, considered as a whole, is an imperfect state 
existing between a state of potency to some actuality and the actuality of this 
potency. Considered according to its whole duration, something is terminated 
or limited which has a beginning and an end.14 This follows from being 
composed of successive parts. In a finite whole, since the parts cannot exist 
together, the whole will have a beginning which differs from its end. Even if 
we suppose some motion to be everlasting, any part of this motion, 
considered as a whole in itself, will have a beginning and an end. What is 
wholly immutable will not.15 What wholly lacks succession possesses its act 
as a simultaneous whole. It neither has a starting point from which it begins 
to be actualized nor a term toward which it proceeds to full act. It is 
interminable and not able to be limited.  
But note that we say interminable life rather than interminable existence. 
As said above, we come to eternity from time as we come to immutability 
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from mutability; because motion itself is a terminable operation or activity, 
so immutable existence is also an activity. In fact, it causes mutable activity16 
and thus must be an activity itself, for an agent cannot cause what it does not 
have in the same way or in a more excellent way. Thus, we say eternity is 
interminable life, because life is a kind of activity. In fact, it is the highest 
activity.17 
In replying to an objection, Aquinas explains the last part of the 
definition: possession. Eternity is the possession of interminable life because 
possession implies “that what is possessed is held firmly and quietly. 
Therefore the word possession is used to designate the immutability and 
permanence of eternity.”18  
 From this derivation of eternity, it is short work for Aquinas to show that 
God is eternal. Having established in ST I, q. 9 that God alone is immutable, 
Aquinas concludes that God is eternal because he is immutable: 
 
The idea of eternity follows upon immutability, just as the idea of time 
follows upon motion, as was said above. Hence, since God is most 
immutable, it most properly belongs to him to be eternal. Not only is he 
eternal, he is his eternity, since whereas no other thing is its own duration, 
because nothing else is its own existence. God however is his own uniform 
existence, whence, just as he is his essence, so he is his own eternity.19 
 
As we have seen throughout the derivation of the Boethian definition of 
eternity, immutability is the foundation for understanding eternity. God is 
eternal because he is immutable.20 A number of additional conclusions 
follow. God is identical with his own eternity, that is, his uniform existence 
without succession does not differ from his essence because of his simplicity. 
Furthermore, only God is eternal since only God is truly immutable.21  
Last of all, and most importantly, God as eternal is timeless. Aquinas 
explains that the distinction of time from eternity is fundamentally based on 
succession or the lack thereof: “But still these differences follow upon that 
first and per se difference, that eternity is wholly simultaneous and time is 
not.”22 Aquinas gives two ways to distinguish eternity from time. First, 
eternity has no potentially or actually distinguishable beginning or end.23 
Since only God is eternal and immutable, both the eternal and eternity itself 
have no beginning or end. Time does have a beginning and end, both in its 
subject—motion—and in itself. However, this is not the most fundamental 
difference between time and eternity. For if we suppose motion to be 
everlasting, the totality of motion would be without beginning or end. The 
same applies to time. Thus, time and eternity, taken as wholes, will not be 
distinct. Nevertheless, even if they are everlasting, motion and time still have 
succession. We can always distinguish the beginning and the end of any one 
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part of motion. The same applies to time. Even if the totality of time is 
without beginning or end, any particular period of time will have a beginning 
or an end. This does not apply to eternity. As a whole, it has no beginning or 
end; as a simultaneous and perfect whole, it has no succession because it has 
no parts whose limits we could mark out. 
Nevertheless, one may still think that time and eternity as measures are 
related as part to whole, for measures of duration cannot co-exist without one 
containing the other, as a day contains an hour. But eternity co-exists with 
time: there is never a time at which it is true to say “God does not exist.”24 
Thus, time and eternity seem to be continuous with one another, i.e. the latter 
contains the former as a measurable part. This would make God temporal by 
making eternity and time part of one measurable continuum. This brings us to 
the second and more fundamental way eternity differs from time: what is 
measured by each essentially differ: eternity measures what is without 
succession, being simultaneously whole; time is a measure of successively 
existing being.25 They are not the same kind of measure.26 But what does it 
mean to speak of eternity as measure of immutable being? Prima facie, this is 
an odd statement to make, for we measure by marking off equal parts of what 
is measured. But an eternal being has no parts. 
In the Commentary on the Physics, Aquinas explains how eternity and 
time are both measures but ones which differ in subject: 
 
For the “now,” insofar as it corresponds to a mobile object, differently 
related, distinguishes the before and after in time. And by its flux it produces 
time, as a point produces a line. Therefore, when different dispositions are 
removed from a mobile object, there remains a substance which is always the 
same. Hence the “now” is understood as always stationary, and not as 
flowing or as having a before and after. Therefore, as the “now” of time is 
understood as the number of a mobile object, the “now” of eternity is 
understood as the number, or rather the unity, of a thing which is always the 
same.27 
 
Measuring considers a whole as divided into equal parts. Since motion is an 
imperfect act, motion as a whole exists successively. The only aspect of 
motion which actually exists in re is the current indivisible state of the 
mobile. The totality exists as a whole only in our mind. By numbering the 
different states which we experience, we measure the motion and perceive 
time. The totality of eternity, on the other hand, exists in re without 
succession. By numbering the eternal “now,” i.e. the eternal subject 
according to its different states, we arrive at our measure. Since it is non-
successive, there is no plurality to number; its measure is unity. Thus, 
eternity essentially differs from time in that its measure is not properly a 
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number at all.28 To be a temporal being is to have some measure of its 
change; its duration consists of a multitude of states in some constant subject. 
An eternal being is not in time because its duration cannot be measured 
quantitatively.29 Its measurable aspect is not a multitude. Eternity is wholly 
apart from time. 
Thus having explained Aquinas’s account of God’s timeless eternity, I 
will now move to an important objection to this account. In his famous essay 
“God Everlasting”,30 Nicholas Wolterstorff presents a strong critique of 
Aquinas’s notion that God is an eternal being “which is without beginning 
and without end, and which has no succession among its aspects.”31 
Wolterstorff maintains God is “everlasting” rather than eternal32 (i.e. God’s 
interminable existence is temporal rather than atemporal) by pointing to an 
apparent inconsistency that arises from divine omniscience belonging to an 
atemporal deity. First, Wolterstorff argues that because knowing an event is 
past or present or future involves temporality, these acts of knowing are 
distinct temporal events, and, therefore, God’s knowledge that an event is 
past, present or future is a temporal act. From this he concludes that God is 
temporal. Second, he argues that just as an event changing from future to 
present to past are successive, so also these three distinct acts of knowing 
occur successively. Therefore, there is a changeful succession of states in 
God, making God mutable. It is worthwhile to quote Wolterstorff at length: 
 
Three such acts [of God which are infected with the temporality of their 
objects] are the diverse though similar acts of knowing about some temporal 
event that it is occurring (that it is present), of knowing about some temporal 
event that it was occurring (that it is past), and of knowing about some 
temporal event that it will be occurring (that it is future). Consider the first of 
these. No one can know about some temporal event e that it is occurring 
except when it is occurring. Before e has begun to occur one cannot know 
that it is occurring, for it is not. Nor after e has ceased to occur can one know 
that it is occurring, for it is not. So suppose that e has a beginning. Then P’s 
knowing about e that it is occurring cannot occur until e begins. And suppose 
that e has an ending. Then P’s knowing about e that it is occurring cannot 
occur beyond e’s cessation. But every temporal event has (by definition) 
either a beginning or an ending. So every case of knowing about some 
temporal event that it is occurring itself either begins or ends (or both). 
Hence the act of knowing about e that it is occurring is infected by the 
temporality of e. So also, the act of knowing about e that it was occurring, 
and the act of knowing about e that it will be occurring, are infected by the 
temporality of e. 
 
But God, as the biblical writers describe him, performs all three of these acts, 
and performs them on temporal events. He knows what is happening in our 
history, what has happened, and what will happen. Hence some of God’s 
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actions are themselves temporal events. But surely the nonoccurrence 
followed by the occurrence followed by the nonoccurrence of such knowings 
constitutes a change on God’s time-strand. Accordingly, God is 
fundamentally noneternal.33 
 
According to Wolterstorff, the act of knowing that an event is occurring34 
must itself occur simultaneously with the event, i.e. there can be no time at 
which the act of knowing occurs at which the event does not also occur. 
Knowing that an event e is present is only possible when e is actually 
occurring. Before e is occurring, we cannot know that e is present because it 
is not the case. Likewise, after e has occurred, we cannot know that is present 
because it is not the case. Because knowing e is occurring is simultaneous 
with e occurring, the temporal measurability of e will also belong to the act 
of knowing that e is occurring. Since God must have true knowledge of any 
temporal event, it appears that the same conditions must apply. He cannot 
know that e is occurring before or after e occurs. When e is not yet occurring 
or is no longer occurring, God must know that e is future or past. God knows 
that e is present only when e is presently occurring. Thus, when e is actually 
occurring, he cannot believe e has ceased to occur or has yet to occur. Such 
belief would be false and, as Aquinas notes, we cannot attribute a false belief 
to God.35 But if we deny that God has any false belief, his knowledge of e 
occurring must have a beginning and an end, which places a distinct temporal 
state in God. The successive transition of e from future to present to past will 
be accompanied by a succession of three distinct states in God: i.e. God will 
be mutable. 
How can we solve this problem? First, we must address Wolterstorff’s 
assumption that if God knows temporal events, he must be temporally 
simultaneous with these events. It is true that even though God is timeless, he 
is said to co-exist with temporal beings. We say God exists simultaneously 
with them. However, we must make a distinction between different senses of 
simultaneity. We say that two entities are simultaneous in the most basic 
sense when they co-exist. Let us therefore define simultaneity simpliciter 
thus:  
 
(1) Two things A and B are simultaneous simpliciter if at some time t it 
is true to say that both A and B exist. 
 
Since we are temporal beings, our knowledge that two things co-exist is itself 
temporal. For this reason, we include the qualifier “at some time t.” This 
simple co-existence is logically prior to temporal co-existence, for temporal 
simultaneity adds an additional condition to this co-existence. For temporal 
beings, to exist simultaneously means there are distinct states in each being 
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which co-exist and which can be identified by the same temporal indexical. 
We may understand the temporal relation of simultaneity in terms of co-
existence at some time t. It was explained above that “Socrates is sitting at 
10:00 am” and “Socrates is sitting at 11:00 am” identify two different 
temporal states in Socrates. Socrates’s act of sitting at 10:00 am was 
simultaneous with a certain position of the sun. His act of sitting at 11:00 am 
was simultaneous with a different position of the sun. The resting state from 
10:00 to 11:00 has a relation of simultaneity with the intervening motion of 
the sun. Even though he has not changed, his sitting is in time because of 
these relations of simultaneity. Let us therefore define temporal simultaneity 
thus: 
 
(2) Two things are temporally simultaneous if it is true to say at some time t 
that both A and B exist and it is true to say that both A and B exist at time t. 
 
By saying “A and B exist at time t,” we mean that A and B have states which 
are actually or potentially distinguished by time t. When we turn to God, we 
see that God is simultaneous simpliciter with temporal events but he is not 
temporally simultaneous. Since God is pure existence, he always exists. It is 
false to say at any time t that God does not exist. Furthermore, it is true to say 
at 10:00 am that both God and Socrates exist for God co-exists with 
everything which exists at 10:00 am. The same holds true for 11:00 am. 
However, God’s simultaneous existence with creatures is not temporally 
simultaneous. “It is the case that Socrates exists at 10:00 am” and “It is true 
to say at 10:00 am that Socrates exists” are both are true statements about 
Socrates. However, on my explanation, these formulations are not both true 
of God. The proposition “It is true to say at 10:00 am that God exists” is true, 
for God always exists. There is no time when saying “God exists” is false. On 
the other hand, we cannot say “It is the case that God exists at 10:00 am.” 
Temporal references to God do not refer to distinct states in God since God is 
simple. “It is the case that God exists at 10:00 am” is false since He does not 
exist at any time. To exist at a time is to be temporal, i.e. to possess a 
multitude of actually or potentially distinct states. If God existed at time t, 
then references to God at t would indicate a state in God distinguishable from 
a state indicated at time t1. This would necessitate that there be a multitude of 
distinct states in God temporally corresponding with every possible time, 
which entails change or the possibility of change in an immutable being. 
However, since there are two senses of simultaneity, we may maintain that 
God’s co-existence with creatures is simultaneous simplicter without making 
God temporal. There is no temporality in God based on relations of 
simultaneity. 
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Wolterstorff, in analyzing Aquinas, fails to make this distinction. 
Although he recognizes Aquinas does not allow for a multitude of actually 
distinct states in God, he does not realize this also implies there cannot be a 
multitude of potentially distinct states in God. “[God’s act of being 
omnipotent] occurs simultaneously with every temporal event whatsoever. 
Since God’s being omnipotent is always occurring, it ‘overlaps’ all temporal 
events whatsoever.”36 Wolterstorff’s language of God’s simple act 
“overlapping” temporal events suggests he is conceiving of eternal existence 
in a similar manner to Geach’s imaginary opponent who thinks of eternity 
like a uniform blue line.37 Although Wolterstorff grasps the uniformity of 
immutability implied by “interminable existence,” the other part of the 
definition of eternity, “simultaneously whole and perfect,” rules out both 
actual and potential distinctions of states in God resulting from Cambridge 
changes. There is no “overlap” since overlap implies a distinction of parts, 
which implies potency, which is contrary to simplicity and immutability. 
Thus Wolterstorff makes the assumption that God’s eternity is temporally 
measurable and that this follows from Aquinas’s admission that God’s 
existence is simultaneous with all times. However, based on our distinction, 
the application of this assumption to Aquinas’s account is unwarranted. 
The non-temporal simultaneity of God and creatures allows for God to 
know all times without any succession in him. Aquinas explains that from the 
perspective of eternity, events which occur at different times are 
simultaneously present to God. Each event e occurs simultaneously with God 
knowing e but God knowing e is not temporally measured by e: 
 
Things which are reduced to act temporally are known by us successively in 
time, but [they are known] by God in eternity, which is above time. Whence 
because we know future contingents insofar as they are such, they cannot be 
certain to us but only to God, whose act of understanding is in eternity above 
time. Just as that man who goes on the road does not see those who come 
after him, but he who looks at the whole road from some height sees together 
all travelling on the road.38 
 
The man on the hill, in one glance, takes in the entire stretch of the road and 
sees all those who are on the road. In this single glance, he can distinguish 
where one traveler on the road is from where one travelling behind him is. He 
does not anticipate or guess where someone on the road is for each traveler is 
present to him. Transferring the metaphor to God’s knowledge of temporal 
events, God knows events occurring at different times without incurring the 
temporal character of these events. Even though an event begins and ends, 
the temporal limits of this event do not mark off distinct states in God. By 
seeing all events simultaneously, the beginning, end and all intermediate 
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states are present together in his knowledge. Thus, for God, knowing the 
succession of events is not a temporal act. It is akin to knowing, by one single 
glance, that different parts of a line are successive. When Aquinas speaks of 
God’s knowledge of the future, he says that such an event “must be 
understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, namely as it is in its 
presentality.”39 If God knows all things in their “presentality,” it seems we 
may maintain that God’s relation with temporal events allows us to say that 
God knows that e is present without infecting or transferring the measurable 
duration of e onto the non-measurable eternal duration of God. Wolterstorff 
assumes that because God is simultaneous with all events, his existence is 
“present” in time rather than in eternity and thus must be measurable 
But there is a difficulty with this solution. To say that past and future 
events are known by God “in their presentality” implies he does not know 
past events as past or future events as future. If God is like an observer on a 
hill to whom every moment in time is present, the distinction of events as 
past, present, or future will be meaningless for God. If event e is present, 
event e1, which is earlier than e, will be past. But since all events are known 
by God “in their presentality,” we may just as well suppose e1 to be present, 
in which case e will be future. Since all events are present to eternity, the 
eternal observer will simultaneously know an event as presently past, 
presently present, and presently future, which renders the real distinction 
between past, present and future incoherent. Thus, events at different times 
will only be actually distinguished insofar as they are earlier than, later than 
and simultaneous with other events.  
From this we end up denying the reality of time and change for the eternal 
observer, since the distinction of past, present and future are essential aspects 
of time. Time, as the measureable quantity of motion, follows necessarily 
upon change. Thus, if there is no time, change is not actually or even 
potentially measureable. Since this measurability arises from the successive 
states of change, the denial of measurability means there is no succession. 
But change is essentially successive. Put succinctly: no time, no change. 
Since all times are simultaneously present to eternity, two different states 
of a motion are not distinguished insofar as one does not exist and one does 
exist; they both exist simultaneously in the subject. They are merely 
distinguished by having different temporal positions in the subject. 
Therefore, for the eternal observer, there is no changeful succession among 
events, in which a continuum of states comes to be and ceases to be in a 
subject.  
However, to remove succession from God by removing from his 
knowledge of creation the changeful succession of states in creation does not 
solve the problem pointed out by Wolterstorff. Per Geach,  
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Put succinctly, if God does not know things as they are, then God is 
mistaken. If we throw this out by protesting that God does know things as 
they are yet all things are present to God “in their presentality,” that God is 
like an observer on a hill who sees every moment in time as present, we end 
up denying the reality of time. To deny the reality of time is to deny the 
reality of change, for since time follows necessarily upon change, if there is 
no time, there is no change. For in [Jewish and Christian] theism an absolute 
distinction has to be made between the eternal unchangeable God and his 
mutable creatures: they depend upon God’s will from moment to moment, 
and by that will could at any moment sink into nothingness. If we reject the 
reality of time, there cannot be this relation between God and creature, and 
therefore traditional theism must be rejected as false.40 
 
As Geach points out elsewhere, “God sees creatures as changing and as 
being in different states at different times, because that is the way things are 
and God sees things the way things are.”41 To maintain the “man on the hill” 
account of eternal knowledge denies that God knows things the way they are. 
If God does not know things as they are, i.e. as temporal, then God is 
mistaken. He is under an illusion. On the other hand, if the divine observer, 
from his vantage point on the hill of eternity, does know things as they are, 
then time and change are not real. This has disastrous consequences for 
theism: the doctrine of the creation of a mutable world must be rejected along 
with any real distinction between the immutable God of theism and his 
mutable creation.42 Therefore, in order for Aquinas’s account of eternity to be 
consistent with divine simplicity, immutability and omniscience, we must 
show how temporal things being subject to divine knowledge “in their 
presentality” does not make time and change unreal for either God or 
creatures. 
However, this problem only obtains if we conceive God as knowing 
motion and time in the same way we do. Thus, we may find the solution to 
our dilemma by considering how God knows temporal things. Wolterstorff 
posits that knowledge of whether a thing is present depends on the succession 
of states of beginning to know that a thing present, knowing it is present and 
ceasing to know that it is present. And this is quite true for those who are in 
time. But for a timeless God, this does not apply. Why not? God knows 
casually rather than observationally. Both our knowledge of temporal acts 
and God’s knowledge of temporal acts concern what exists successively. 
However, our knowledge of this succession is itself successive whereas 
God’s knowledge of this succession is not successive.43 
As temporal creatures, we come to know observationally. Our concepts of 
motion and time are formed by our sense experience of motion. I know that 
Socrates is walking because I see Socrates walking. Because motion is an 
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imperfect act, the actualities of being in each location belong to Socrates 
successively. I see Socrates passing through different locations, and mark 
these out successively in my memory. Thus, my knowledge of the temporal 
event “Socrates is walking,” a successive act, is itself a successive act. 
God, however, does not know motion and time observationally by 
conforming himself to the way things are. Rather, God knows insofar as 
things conform to him. That is to say, his knowledge is not caused but causal. 
As Aquinas notes in the Summa Contra Gentiles, "The divine intellect does 
not gather its knowledge from things, as does ours; rather…it is through its 
knowledge the cause of things."44 What exactly does such causal knowledge 
entail? Aquinas provides an analogy: 
 
The knowledge of the divine intellect is to other things as the knowledge of 
an artisan to artifacts, since through his knowledge he is the cause of things. 
Now, the artisan knows through his art even those things that have not been 
yet fashioned, since the forms of his art flow from his knowledge to external 
matter for the constitution of the artifacts. Hence nothing forbids that there be 
in the knowledge of an artisan forms that have not yet come out of it. Thus 
nothing forbids God to have knowledge of things that are not.45 
 
God’s knows future contingents because he knows what he is going to do. 
Although the effect is brought about successively in time, the artisan 
comprehends his effect without succession. He knows the form which will be 
brought about because he has the form of the effect in him. Likewise, God 
does not need to observe his effects in order to know them. The series of 
temporally ordered events is present all at once to the divine knowledge 
because God knows everything by one simple act. Just as the artisan knows 
every effect he will cause before he causes it, so to God knows every event 
before it occurs, when it occurs, and after it occurs. God’s knowledge of an 
event does not depend on observing it. There no succession in God’s 
knowledge because God does not understand motion or time by composing 
the whole from successive experiences of the parts. Rather he understands 
simultaneously every effect which he may cause because he pre-contains all 
effects in his power. 
But what is the proper object of God’s knowledge? It is not the temporal 
events but himself. Since God knows himself and by this knowledge he 
knows all things insofar as he knows all the effects which he can bring about, 
all events at all times are “present” to him. He knows them insofar as he 
intends them as effects. This “presentness” does not imply actual existence 
outside God. At this moment, God knows that I am going to be eating dinner 
tonight with my wife. Being a future contingent, we cannot say with certainty 
whether it will. However, it is not the case that God believes this event 
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actually exists in the order of things as we speak. He knows it because it is 
present in his will as an intended effect. When it does in fact occur, it will be 
temporally present and actual in the thing. 
God knows change insofar as he knows that a subject is one way at one 
time and a different way at a different time. This does not involve change in 
God, but in things. God knows all things by one unchanging act. He causes 
all things by this same one unchanging act. When what is currently future 
becomes present, there is no change in God but a change in the subject of the 
event. I am sitting here now but later I will be at a restaurant. I am not eating 
a steak at the local diner now, so I change. God, on the other hand, being 
eternal, is not subject to my successive states because he causes it all by one 
act. 
His knowledge and plan are not present to him like a strip of film which 
contains every shot in a movie but can only be comprehended by 
successively examining one frame after another one. Rather his knowledge 
and plan are present together without any distinction of parts. The succession 
which we experience is brought about in creation without any change or 
succession in him. The succession occurs entirely on the side of things, not 
God. 
What effects occur depend on the state of the object being acted upon. 
There is succession in creatures because matter must be disposed to receive 
forms. Taking an example from Aquinas, fire does not change its temperature 
when heating water but remains the same throughout. It is the water that 
undergoes change. Are we to posit that there are different states of heat in the 
fire successively as there are different states of heat in the water 
successively? Of course not. Nevertheless, each state which comes to be in 
the water pre-exists in the fire through the fire’s power to heat. Even though 
we may attribute to the fire the successive states of causing 90° and causing 
100°, this does not mean there are different states in the fire when the water is 
at these different temperatures. This succession exists solely in the water. 
 Likewise, there are not different states of knowledge in God regarding 
the past or present or future. God knows what he knows by a single, perfect 
act devoid of potency, and he cannot know more than he knows. The changes 
of creatures do not imply any real change in God nor does his knowledge of 
what he causes change. This causal knowledge is simple and invariant. 
To posit that God does not know things as changing because he does not 
change is to assert that the only way to know change is to change. It is to 
presuppose that God is in time. We know past, present, and future insofar as 
these events are temporally simultaneous with us. God, as eternally present to 
any time and any instant of time, is not temporally simultaneous. He does not 
know past, present and future in the same way we do, namely as temporally 
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related to our awareness, since he is not in time. Aquinas elaborates on this 
principle (using a spatial metaphor): 
 
Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is 
present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an 
example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a determined point on 
the circumference of the circle. Although it is indivisible, it does not co-exist 
simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the order of 
position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other hand, 
the center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly 
opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, 
whatever is found in any part of time co-exists with what is eternal as being 
present to it, although with respect to some other time it be past or future. 
Something can be present to what is eternal only by being present to the 
whole of it, since the eternal does not have the duration of succession. The 
divine intellect, therefore, sees the whole of eternity, as being present to it, 
whatever takes place through the whole course of time. And yet what takes 
place in a certain part of time was not always existent. It remains, therefore, 
that God has a knowledge of those things that according to the march of time 
do not yet exist.46 
 
Aquinas notes that “eternity is present in its presentality to any time or instant 
of time.” However, this does not mean temporally simultaneous. What does it 
mean to be present other than to be actual? As Wolterstorff himself points 
out, what is past is not occurring. Likewise for what is future. But for an 
event to be occurring is nothing other than to be actual. The actuality of a 
thing, as opposed to the potentiality of a thing, is what we mean when we say 
something is present. Thus God is present to all times. We may make true 
statements about God at any time (“God is eternal” or “God is good”) and the 
different times at which we say this do not imply any difference in God, for 
as noted by Geach above, we cannot distinguish states in God based on 
external relations of succession. Moreover, we can truly say that God causes 
different things at different times without positing any change in Him 
because he is simple and present (i.e. actual) to all times through his causal 
act of sustaining creation. This likewise does not create any succession in 
God, for since God acts by one single, simple act which contains all possible 
effects, the changes which we see around us are not a result of God 
performing a different act, as if parting the Red Sea and the destruction of 
Sodom and Gommorah are accomplished by numerically different states of 
divine power. God can do all these actions by one power, one act. Similarly, 
since God knows all things causally, the knowledge of these things will not 
differentiate his act of knowing. 
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God is present to all times unchangingly, unlike temporal creatures which 
are only present to what is temporally simultaneous. Thus, God does not 
know what is present in the sense of being temporally simultaneous. 
“Whatever is found in any part of time co-exists with what is eternal as being 
present to it, although with respect to some other time it be past or future.” 
As we analyzed above, all things are present which are actual. Something is 
present to an eternal God insofar as it is actual. It is past or future to us 
insofar as these relate to a non-actual state in us as simultaneously actual. But 
for God, there is no potency. Temporal events do not relate to God as past or 
future as they relate to us. God knows the past as past insofar as he has 
caused it, but this does not involve a change in his act of causing. Since he 
knows what he causes, there is no change in knowing that his effect is no 
longer actual. 
While it is difficult to fully understand how an eternal being knows time 
because our own knowledge of time and change is itself in time, what we do 
see is that we ought not to attribute to God the same mode of knowledge as 
creatures. Knowing past, present and future belong to God in a different way 
than they do to us. We may not be fully able to explicate the constitution of 
this mode, but, on the basis of Aquinas’s account, we may consistently hold 
that this different mode exists. 
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(Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 
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cannot be measured by time, but it is a principle of time; it is in time as its principle, 
just as a point is in a line, even though neither time nor a line are composed of their 
partless principles. What is composed from an infinity of non-contiguous points is 
only a whole accidentally. When we speak of a line being composed of points, taking 
the limit of a continual division of a line, we do nothing more than provide a 
conceptual device, albeit a useful one. Parallel lines are said to meet at infinity, even 
though there is no particular distinguishable point we can mark out where both lines 
coincide. 
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when both e1 and e2 are future, when e1 is present and e2 is future, when e1 is past and 
e2 is present, and when both e1 and e2 are past. McTaggart argues that these 
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past, presently present or presently future (Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting”, p. 490). 
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aspects will be part of an event with B-characteristics. Put another way, if ‘α’ is truly 
predicated of God, then any proposition in which A-characteristics or B-
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33 Wolterstorff, "God Everlasting", 485-504 p. 499 
34 Wolterstorff defines an event as some aspect of a subject: “[an event] consists in 
something’s actually having some property, or something’s actually performing some 
action, or something’s actually standing in some relation to something” (Wolterstorff, 
“God Everlasting”, p. 487). An event may be something such as “being tan” or 
“running on the beach” or “being Plato’s teacher.” Moreover, one event may belong 
to multiple subjects (Ibid. p. 488). For example, the event of Socrates sitting under a 
tree belongs both to Socrates and the tree. The aspect “sitting under this tree” belongs 
to Socrates and the aspect “being sat under by Socrates” belongs to the tree. Insofar as 
this has temporal relations to other events, the subjects of these events will be called 
temporal. However, this seems to imply that every event of being related will belong 
to both subjects as distinct aspects of each subject. Consider Wolterstorff’s own 
example of Euclid referring to the number three. On his account, this event will 
belong to both Euclid and the number three. Thus, he explains that the event of “being 
referred to by Euclid” constitutes a distinct aspect belonging to the number three 
(Ibid. p. 489) 
This is an example of what Aquinas calls a relation which is only real in one 
direction (ST I, q. 13, a. 7c), which Geach calls a merely Cambridge change. In such 
cases, “A is related to B” refers to a real, distinct state in A; “B is related to A” is a 
logical predicate which refers to an idea, a logical state rather than a real, distinct state 
in B. When Plato thinks of Socrates, there is a real change in Plato; the idea of 
Socrates comes to exist in his mind. When Socrates is thought of by Plato, no such 
state comes to be in Socrates. If this were not the case, Socrates would be aware that 
he had begun to be thought of, even though anyone watching Socrates would not 
observe a change in him. There is no real distinction of states in Socrates when he is 
thought of and when no one pays him any mind. 
However, as far as I can tell, Wolterstorff does not recognize that this logical 
state “being thought of by Plato” is fundamentally different in kind from the real 
aspect “thinking of Socrates.” Although he notes that a series of successive references 
to the number three would not constitute “changeful succession,” it constitutes as 
succession of distinct states nonetheless. Presumably for Wolterstorff, the event “A is 
related to B” occurs because A has the aspect “relating to B.” But since every relation 
Reflections on Medieval Philosophy 284 
                                                                                                                        
involves two terms, this event can only occur if B has the corresponding aspect “being 
related to by A.” Since “B is being related to by A” may be assigned both an A-
characteristic and a B-characteristic, it is involves a temporally distinct state in B. 
Thus, every relation of some term A to another term B necessarily entails that both A 
and B possess distinct aspects in themselves. 
This of course goes against what I noted above, namely that merely Cambridge 
changes do not imply a really distinct state in the subject. They indicate a logically 
distinct state which either corresponds per accidens to a potentially distinct state in 
the subject (in the case of a resting body) or does not correspond to any state at all (in 
the case of an immutable being). 
35 Cf. SCG I. 66.   
36 Ibid. p. 498 
37 At the risk of going against Geach’s warning about using spatial images to solve 
problems with time, let us suggest a different image. Wolterstorff should not think of 
eternity as a uniformly colored straight line running parallel another straight line 
representing time. Rather, he should think of eternity as the vertex of a cone with time 
as the circumference of a circle somewhere on the cone’s surface. The vertex point is 
“simultaneous” with every point on the circumference insofar as we may pass a 
straight line through both the vertex and any point on the circumference. Although 
every point on the circumference is present to the vertex, the vertex does not 
“overlap” any segments of the circumference. It is present to the whole circle without 
being a circle or being on the circumference. Even though different points on the 
circle are related to the vertex, these relations do not entail that there are parts in the 
vertex. 
38 ST I, q. 14, a. 13, ad. 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae teporaliter in actum 
reducuntur, a nobis successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae 
est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia inquantum talia 
sunt, certa esse non possunt: sed soli Deo, cuius intelligere est in aeternitate supra 
tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt: sed ille qui 
ab aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes trnseuntes per viam. 
39 ST I, q. 14, a. 13, ad. 2: Et similter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illu erit, 
consequens intelligendum est prout subset divinae scientiae, scilicet prout est in sua 
praesentialitate. 
40 P. T. Geach, Truth, Love, and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart's 
Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 163 
41 Geach, God and the Soul p. 93 
42 “Even if there were not decisive reasons for rejecting as logically incoherent the 
theory that time and succession do not exist ‘from God’s point of view’, we should 
still need to notice that no Christian apologist can use this theory. For the one thing 
that is clear about Divine creation is that the things created have to be temporal, even 
if the Creator and his creative act are held to be eternal. If time is an illusion, then 
there is not the sort of mutable world that can be supposed to be a creation; so in this 
case the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation has to be rejected. Significantly the 
doctrine was rejected by great metaphysical thinkers, Spinoza and Bradley and 
McTaggart, who denied the reality of time. And again, if time is an illusion, this 
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strikes at something that is central to the Christian creed: its reference to a datable 
event in time—the crucifixion of Christ under Pontius Pilate.” Geach, God and the 
Soul pp. 92-93 
43 Cf. ST I, q. 14, a. 13, ad. 3 
44 SCG 1.65 from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Anton C. Pegis, 
trans. Anton C. Pegis, Vol. 1 (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1995). p. 
215 
45 SCG 1.66 from Ibid. pp. 218-19 
46 Ibid. 
